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ASPECTS OF ENGLISH LAW CONCERNING PIRACY AND 
PRIVATEERING 1603 - 1760 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
Piracy and Privateering are certainly m u c h  written about subjects, and there is indeed extensive 
literature concerning many aspects and facets of the complicated history of the subjects.  A glance at 
the Gosse Collection on piracy at the National Maritime Museum or a search through the archives of 
the British Library will illustrate this point admirably.   It came to my attention, however, that one 
aspect of piracy and privateering that had not so much been overlooked, but had never really been 
treated as a separate subject, was the law.   Surprisingly even Charles Wye Kendall of the Middle 
Temple and Barrister-at-Law, in his work Private Men-of-War had only scantily covered this area, 
homogenised into the whole text of his book.  There is no doubt that both piracy and privateering 
have had differing effects on trade and commerce in seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe and 
Anglo-America and hence had a wide social context and significance.   As a result historians have 
taken the subjects, especially privateering, seriously although it has often been overshadowed by the 
historian’s preference for writing about the Navies of Europe.  As a result of this social significance it 
was only a matter of course that a myriad of laws and statutes sprung up to control, inhibit, deter and 
prevent, around these controversial ways of life. 
 
 
It has been my intention, therefore, to try to give an account of the main aspects of the law as it 
reacted to the post-Elizabethan period of piracy and privateering up until its decline in the eighteenth 
century.  Two limiting factors must be born in mind by readers, f i r s t l y  time: it has been scarcely six 
months from conception to  completion; and secondly the length of the essay has  considerably 
reduced the scope of the work. 
 
 
As a result I do not pretend to have covered anywhere near the full scope of the topic, and there is 
indeed much more work that could be done to throw light on this subject.   Nor do I pretend to have 
got it completely right, and would welcome constructive criticism.  It is hoped that I have shed some 
light and I would venture to suggest that, if nothing else, I have pooled some knowledge of an aspect 
of piracy and privateering that  has not been pooled in such a way before. The sources of 
information I have used are a mixture of primary and secondary.  The manuscripts and the acts of 
Parliament I have used all came from the National Maritime Museum as did some printed works 
dating from 1726 to the present.  Other printed books came from the British Library. 
 
 
Thanks are therefore due to the staff of both the National Maritime Museum and the British Museum. 
Special thanks go to Dr Colin Martin and Professor Christopher Smout for their concern and help at 
very short notice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Piracy, and its sister occupation, Privateering, have captured the imaginations of millions of people 
as a romantic  and  daring  occupation,  made familiar  to  us by  the literature  of  the 18th  and  19th 
centuries and, given a Hollywood facelift, piracy could appeal to almost anyone. 
 
 
The harsh reality of this often cruel way of life could not be more different.   Piracy in the 17th and 
 
18th centuries was a barbaric and dangerous occupation that would have demanded steel nerves and a 
total lack of remorse.  It was a hazardous and cruel life as a sailor on the high seas, but pirates and 
privateers doubled the danger and often took their lives in their own hands, and took those of others 
without thinking twice.  The lure of riches was a strong one indeed for anyone who could take the 
hardships.  Fortunes were made and lost in this way. 
 
 
The reason for which I have isolated this period of study is that the period saw an interesting change 
in England’s overseas policy.  Privateering had seen great days at the latter half of the 16th century 
with  the  rise  of  such  infamous  figures  as  Francis  Drake  and  John  Hawkins.  This p e r io d  of 
entrepreneurial venture and free-for-all treasure hunting in the form of legal private warfare was to 
draw to a close at the start of the 17th Century (Senior 1976, 7).  This change was dominated by the 
Succession of t he  Stuarts over  the Tudors.    Elizabeth’s reign had been earmarked b y  20 years of 
sporadic war with Spain, which, although it had been a very costly exercise had also served to give 
wealth to many enterprising privateers.   Suddenly with the succession of James Stuart, England was 
thrown into a long period of peace.  This ultimately led to a massive increase in piracy.  Now British 
privateers had no legal enemy, and a rapid degeneration into piracy was their only alternative if they 
wanted to keep a healthy income of Prize (Senior 1976, 7-11).  An agreement with Spain was made 
that the English privateers might be kept out of the West Indies and that if they should fall into the 
hands of  the Spaniards  they might be put into  the hands of the Spanish Inquisition, much to the 
distaste of  the English seamen  (Macintyre 1975,  29).   This allowed the British and  the French to 
freely ship contraband.   This in turn forced the Spaniards to move from the north and west coasts of 
Hispaniola.   The English and French then settled, and hunted the cattle and pigs that had been left 
behind and gone wild, and by ‘boucanning’ or smoking the meat they could preserve it and sell it, and 
the hides, to the seamen in the Caribbean.   These men became known as ‘Buccaneers’ and often 
turned their hands to piracy when the cattle ran low. 
 
 
But the early   period of the 17th century was not the only time that saw an increase in piracy due to 
political events. The Civil War was to provide the germination for the seed that had been waiting for 
its chance.  Too many years of peace had made pirates or even merchants ready to jump at the chance 
to hunt for prize legally. British merchant shipping had suffered during the Civil War from the 
3 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
privateers of both the Commonwealth and Royalist factions  “as well as from the usual pirate craft 
that  lay  off  the  African  Coast”  (Crump  1931,  92),  while  the English  could  do  little  to  protect 
merchant  shipping.  The  end  of  the  Civil  War  brought  a  near  end  to  this  period  of  Royalist 
privateering, and the new government was posed with the problem of monopolising English trade in 
the West Indies and securing this trade against piracy and privateering.  This can only make one think 
they could have bitten off more than they could chew, as whilst they clearly reduced the level of 
piracy and privateering, they served only to cause friction with the Dutch whose trade suffered 
considerably. 
 
 
This set off a chain of events out of which the privateers and pirates could only have benefited. 
Firstly, a war with the Dutch inevitably came about, once over a war with Spain ensued. 
 
 
“These years of naval war saw an enormous growth of privateering and piracy, the natural corollary 
of privateering.   Much of the fighting in the West Indies was carried out by  private   men-of-war 
sailing under letters of Marque, and the profits were sufficiently great to attract capital and men in 
considerable  numbers.   When  letters of Marque could not be obtained, such privateers  frequently 
turned  pirate,  so  that  peace  at  home  did  not  mean   peace  at  sea.     Thus, the policy of the 
Commonwealth let to an increased need for machinery to enforce trade laws and to deal with prize 
and piracy” (Crump 1931. 93). 
 
 
The Commonwealth’s emphatic need to establish itself in the divided colonies, and to monopolise 
(i.e. hold most of the trade, and allow the Dutch as little as possible) the trade had led inadvertently 
to war, through which an increase in private and illegal war, meant an increase in piracy.   It was 
partly because of this that with the Restoration and Coronation of Charles II in 1660,  that a  new 
special appointment was made that was to extend the power of the Admiralty to the Colonies.   This 
appointment was that of Lord High Admiral of the Plantations. ‘‘for the greater part of the period 
1650-1697, there was in existence a body of men responsible for administering the colonies” 
(Crump 1931, 93).  More of which is given in later chapters. 
 
 
By the end of the 17th century this body of men had developed into the Board of Trade (established 
 
1696).  This Board would meet four times a week to discuss colonial problems, one of these problems 
being, of course, piracy.  As a result, in 1697, a campaign was begun to curb piracy and illegal trade 
(Steele 1968, 42-59). 
 
 
One of the first large scale anti-piracy events that took place was the planned attack on Santa Maria, 
in the East Indies, a notorious pirate stronghold, but although a fleet was despatched to deal with this 
den of iniquity,  no attempt was made due to administrative  problems.   The Board also had a large 
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hand in dealing with the changing of laws concerning  the punishment of pirates, which were at the 
time wholly inadequate. At that time for acts of piracy, although a capital offence, few offenders were 
punished due to the inadequacy of the Judicial system,   so it was apparent that admiralty and vice- 
admiralty would need power to try and execute pirates if an effect was to be seen (Steele 1968). 
 
 
In  the  early  18th  century,  so  called   Anglo-American  pirates are  said  to  have implemented an 
“Imperial Crises” with their plundering of mercantile  vessels for a whole decade  (1716  - 1726) 
despite  partially  successful attempts  to remove piracy from  the seas (Rediker  1987, 254).    There 
appeared, at this time, a great increase in the amount of pirates roaming the seas in search of prey. 
Why should this be?  The most probable answer was the radical changes that took place in the Royal 
Navy at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1713).   The manpower of the Royal Navy 
plummeted from almost 50,000 to as little as 13,500 in just two years (Lloyd 1970, 287).  To worsen 
the situation, all the privateering licences, the letters of Marque, would have been invalid  with the 
commencement  of peace - perhaps doubling the amount of unemployed seamen looking for ways to 
make a living. 
 
 
“The surplus of labour at the end of the war had extensive, sometimes jarring social and economic 
effects” (Rediker 1987, 282). Such an effect was a lessening of seamen’s wages over the next few 
years, creating a rush for the comparatively well paid ‘profession’ of piracy.  Government action was 
needed to soften the effect that piracy was having on trade, and pardons were offered to pirates in 
1711 and 1718 (Davis 1962).   This failed miserably and the royal officials decided to turn again to 
harsher tactics, which involved more hangings as a deterrent, coupled with laws that “criminalised all 
contact with pirates” (Redikar 1987, 283). 
 
 
By 1725 a number of changes had been made in the way privateering was carried out.   Letters of 
reprisal were no longer issued if the subject of the letter was of a nation that England was not at war 
with.  Most trading vessels   carried letters of marque but were not privateers in the predatory sense, 
and were authorised to attack enemy ships but not to go out of their way to find them (Kendall 1931, 
156). 
 
 
One of the most interesting stories tells of a privateer, Captain Robert Jenkins, who in 1731 sparked 
off a chain of events that ultimately   led to a minor war with Spain.  Whilst in the West Indies his 
ship Rebecca was stopped by the Spanish Guarda Costa and searched for contraband.   Not content 
with the legality of his ship - which held no contraband -they cut off his ear.  Jenkins complained to 
the King, and appealed to the House of Commons, which drove the government to the attack on the 
Spanish Colonies, which was known as the ‘War of Jenkins’ Ear’. 
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Little happened in this episode but this war heralded the  “last great phase of privateering” (Kendall 
 
1931, 176).   From th i s  episode we can determine that at that time privateering was an economic 
force to be reckoned with, and it must have held considerable influence in the 
Government.  It was still a comparative money spinner for the Crown and a number of 
influential people had attained high social positions due to the wealth it had brought them. 
 
 
One story that illustrates this point is that of a carpenter called Baker who tried his hand at 
shipwrighting and built a ship for the merchant service.  His work was so poor, however, that no-one 
would buy his ship.   He then had little option but to equip his ship as a privateer.   As the Mentor 
sailed off down the Mersey, the opinion of the experts was that she was a ‘cranky’ vessel and that she 
was likely to capsize.  But on her way south she came across a French East-Indiaman, the Carnatic 
which although seemingly more powerful than the Mentor was suspected of having a number of false 
guns.  After a brief engagement the Carnatic was Baker’s.   He had his fortune, built a palatial 
residence and eventually became the Mayor of Liverpool (Jameson 1923). 
 
 
By the end of the first quarter of the 18th century England had  decided to deal with the pirates in an 
effective way and a growing hostility, and tightening of procedures, such as financial penalties, was 
made toward privateering. As the 18th century progressed the effectiveness of this policy grew and 
eventually, but the end of the 18th century piracy was almost outlawed, and privateering was treated in 
a strict and restricting manner.  Perhaps  the highest  factor  in the reduction of piracy, especially in the 
Caribbean, during  this century was  the  increase in  the  power  of  the Royal  Navy.    It was by 
effective patrolling, the vast increase in naval vessels, and a no-nonsense policy,  that the Royal Navy 
systematically reduced piracy, often by force.  Indeed, from 1756 to 1760 the naval expenses of Great 
Britain doubled ( Bromley 1987, 500).   Pirates were hanged twenty or fifty at a time instead o f  the 
usual four, and by the middle of the century the campaign had been effective, and the period of our 
history that has become known as “the golden age of piracy” had come to an end (Ritchie 1986, 19). 
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THE ADMIRALTY AND VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS 
 
Piracy had been a problem for many years before attempts were made to establish an Institution to 
deal with those seamen who believed that robbery was a viable career.  The establishment of the 
Admiralty Court appears to have taken place around the middle of the 14th century.   It has been 
observed that, although there is a large amount of contemporary documentation on the subject of the 
Courts, there appear to be no actual word for word accounts of the hearings of pirates themselves.  It 
has been suggested that this is due to the fact that the proceedings were already written and there was 
little for the Court to do apart from brief the jury and come to a conclusion (Berckman 1979, 5). 
 
 
During the majority of the 17th century, the laws and courts for dealing with piracy were wholly 
inadequate, especially those that were established in the Colonies.   It was not until the end of this 
century that the addition of two important Statutes changed the effectiveness of the Law Courts in the 
Colonies, b y  giving them “parliamentary recognition” (Crump, 1931).    The establishment of these 
Courts was due to the inadequacy of the Common Law Courts in dealing with maritime cases, and to 
start with, commissions were issued to take care of piracy or other disputes, provided they were 
below the high water mark, which was the limit of the Admiralty’s jurisdiction (Crump 1931, 3). 
 
 
Originally, in the 13th century, it would have been up to the King h i m s e l f  to make decisions 
about the legal questions at sea, and these cases would have been tried before the King in Council 
(Marsden 1915, IX Vol. l).  Not only was this time-consuming, and costly but it also totally failed to 
meet the required number of cases.  So there was always a backlog. 
 
 
The next step meant that the Common Law Courts took over the maritime affairs but as the admirals 
of the fleets became more powerful in connection with the law, the Common Law Courts began to 
lose their power of exercising routine jurisdictions. 
 
 
The final step was to appoint someone to take over the maritime affairs of the Common Law Courts. 
The task naturally fell to one of the three admirals that controlled the fleet in the 14th century. 
 
 
The first man to be appointed as the Commander of all t h e  fleets of England was Sir John 
Beauchamp, between 1340 and 1360.  The Royal patents issued to him give him the right to hold 
Admiralty Courts, hear pleas and to appoint a deputy if the need arose.   He not only held control of 
the navies, but  was also  responsible for, among  other  things,  the suppression  of  piracy, and  the 
collection  of  Royal  Dues  (Marsden  1915,  xlii  Vol. l).     This individual  held  an immense 
a m o u n t  o f  responsibility and an obviously  busy and important job.  
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At the beginning of the 16th century, the Admiralty Court was having problems with the convicting 
of pirates in these courts, due to the civil law. Witnesses against these crimes committed at sea were 
rarely alive to give evidence, or if they were alive they might have sailed for distant parts, which 
meant that a pirate might “only be condemned by his own confession”  (Crump 1931, 12).  Because of 
this, Parliament passed a law that these cases should be heard under common law by commission of 
the Great Seal.   These cases, ho we ve r , were to be held by the Lord Admiral or his subordinates, 
indicating that the common law was not to be relied on too heavily. 
 
 
By the middle of the 16th century the trade and commerce had grown sufficiently to  render the 
Admiralty Courts incapable of coping with the flow of cases that were to fill their books. One way of 
enlarging the capacity of the Admiralty Court was to produce ‘sub-courts’ that would be established 
around the  country.   Coupled with this was the fact that as the role of the navy became more 
important, the one effect was to give problems to the judicial side of the Admiralty (Crump 1931, 12- 
23). To cope with the new, and large, amount of administrative work, the role of the Vice-Admiral 
 
was created. 
 
 
These  Vice-Admirals  were  to  hold  courts  in   their  allotted  areas,  and,  if  they  were  judicially 
untrained, were to have a deputy who was both civilian and trained in the law (Crump 1931, 13). 
 
 
These Vice-Admirals were of course responsible for dealing  with piracy, but  the case is different: 
these officials  “not  only  proved to  be inept  at  curbing  the  piratical  inclinations of the  coastal 
inhabitants;   many were similarly inclined themselves.  The extent of admiralty corruption was 
outstanding, even in an age in which a certain degree of financial dishonesty was an acceptable 
concomitant of most official posts” (Senior 1976, 127). 
 
 
The Vice-Admiralty Courts tended to travel around the district, which might have included one or 
more counties, and would set up their court in the major town, whilst drawing a jury from the 
surrounding ports and towns (Pares 1938, 77-84).  This was known as “going their Rounds”. 
 
 
From the surviving documentary evidence we can piece together the manner in which these courts 
were h e l d .    Firstly  the  witness  would  give  his  statement,  which  could  be  rather  lengthy,  and 
apparently uninterrupted from questions.  At this point the witness was examined by the judge in the 
“Interrogatory”, which involved “a merciless review of every statement the witness has made, with 
the most grinding and detailed inquisition concerning it”.  It seems that each member of the jury 
could read and write, and it may have been that the jury was handed a copy of the “Juratores”, or the 
accusations.  This could have served as a reference for any jurymen who were unsure of their verdict, 
 8 
 
 
THE ADMIRALTY AND VICE ADMIRALTY COURTS 
 
and it may even be that such men might have had the chance to ask witnesses questions to help them 
decide (Berckman 1979, 7-9). 
 
 
Eventually   this  vice-admiralty  jurisdiction  would  spread  to  the  colonies  in  North  and  Central 
America.  During the first half of the 17th century there was a tide of emigrants seeking new lives in 
the New World.   With them went their lifestyles, religions and even their laws.   New settlements 
were founded, and while the hard work was being done, there was little time, place, or money for the 
tribal life and petty bureaucracy of 16th century law.  But once established, the English law system 
was to take its hold.  Perhaps from the 1620s and 30s onward, vice-admirals were establishing their 
jurisdictions and gaining control of the plantations and other trade (Crump 1931, 25). 
 
 
By the end of this century vice-admiralty courts had been established in the Colonies and were  
practising English law.   They did, however , have a number  of vital weaknesses, and they were 
severely limited in the powers that they could exercise.  Not only did captured prize vessels have to 
be sent back to London to be judged by a prize Court, but also pirates arrested had to be sent back to 
London to be tried, and could not be dealt with by the vice-admiralty courts set up in the Colonies 
(NMM 1730,  30).    This  was not only  inconvenient,  but  costly  and  often  proved  disastrous  as 
witnesses refused to travel or died in transit, prisoners escaped or died in transit, and often  many 
months passed between arrest and trial.  Despite this, there were certain individuals who believed that 
there was little need for an admiralty court to take over the responsibilities of the Colonies.    Sir 
Thomas Lynch, Governor of Jamaica, implied that there was little need for an admiralty court at that 
time to deal with such specialised cases as piracy. 
 
 
During the middle of the 17th century, Jamaica was making a lot of money from privateering and the 
admiralty court in London was overwhelmed with condemning prizes she had brought in.  As a result 
in 1662 instructions were given to establish an admiralty court in Jamaica, this island being the only 
place considered viable for such a court (Crump 1931, 109). 
 
 
From that point onwards the admiralty court sat when the need arose.  One such occasion being a trial 
held by Sir Henry Morgan, acting as Admiral’s Judge, a position deemed important enough to hold 
such a court in Jamaica.  It seems that the governor of the island held the power to authorise the court 
to be held. 
 
 
But there is the possibility that the Jamaican Admiralty Court was by no means legitimate.  The High 
Court of the Admiralty in England itself could try prize, but piracy was dealt with by a Special Court, 
that of Oyer and Terminer (more of which later), as decreed under a Statute of Henry VIII (NMM 
1730, 25-33), while the Jamaican Court of the Admiralty liberally entitled itself to both prize and 
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piracy. The reason as to why this must be is presumably because of the cost and inconvenience of 
sending back prisoners and prize to England, while the Governors that acted as judges in Jamaica 
believed that it could be done efficiently, cost effectively and as fairly as in London, despite the fact 
that the Jamaican admiralty court was presumed a mere equal of the lesser vice-admiralty courts. 
 
 
There was in 1684   objection at the fact   that in the colonies (Jamaica at least) pirates were being 
tried by their own admiralty court.  They argue that according to the Statute of 28 Henry VIII, they 
should be tried by Oyer and Terminer (NMM 1730, 25).  The law was merely manoeuvred around by 
the implication that the Statute of Henry VIII did not extend to the colonies (Crump 1931, 113). 
 
 
By the end of the 17th century a very important Act had been passed that was to have a great effect 
on the power of the Vice-Admiralty Courts in the colonies.  This was “An Act for the more effectual 
Suppression of Piracy” of 1698 (NMM: 1699).  This enabled the pirates in the colonies to be dealt 
with in the country where they had committed the crime.  Not only did it give the various vice- 
admiralty courts the authorisation to try piracy by Oyer and Terminer, (more of which later), but it 
also issued vice-admiralty jurisdiction to the naval commanders of anti-piracy expeditions.  (NMM:   
1699). Therefore these vice-admiralty courts abroad received Parliamentary Recognition. 
 
 
The reason why so much has been written about, and why so much material remains, about the 
 
Jamaican Admiralty Court is neatly summed up by Helen Crump (1931, IlS-6): 
 
 
“It was in Jamaica that an admiralty court first came into full life.  From the turmoils of naval war 
from the prizes of the buccaneers and the spoils of pirates, in all of which Jamaica was more closely 
concerned than were other colonies, its admiralty court had drawn its life, its successive officers their 
emoluments.” 
 
 
Of course there was also much trouble with piracy and privateering in other colonies as well and it was 
just a matter of time before vice-admiralty courts appeared in other locations.  Certain vice- admirals 
were put in charge of the Barbados Islands and Tangiers, but often the warrants were re-noted by 
the 18th century and it was felt they were not needed.  But the courts that were later to be established 
in New England were to become busy with the passing of prizes that would litter the ports in years to 
come. 
 
 
The eventual suppression of piracy in the middle of the 18th century finally lifted the pressure off the 
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courts in the colonies, so that they could  deal with  the more pressing matters  of prize cases from 
which both the admiralty and the government earned a great deal in revenue.   But of course piracy 
had not been quashed completely, and as long as there were letters of Marque issued to privateers 
during periods of war, many of them would need an occupation to tum to in peace time, and this was 
inevitably piracy.  So although the flow of piracy cases was lessened, it had by no means diminished 
completely. 
THE LAW OF PRIZE 
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One of the most important aspects of privateering that was looked after by the admiralty courts was the 
law of prize.   It was a complex subject, and prize courts were set up especially to deal with the vast flow of 
hearings that were to be made, mainly during periods of war. 
 
 
The importance of prize jurisdiction had been increasing over the last fifty  years in the High Court  of 
the Admiralty, and  it was being realised  that prize  law  would  have  to take over  from  the outdated 
system of Common  Law, despite opposition. 
 
 
The year 1627 saw the prize court take on the form which was to govern it for the next century and 
“Marks an important step in the evolution of the prize court by the appointment of Commissioners to 
receive, make an inventory of, and sell all goods adjudged lawful prize”  (Kendall 1931, 69). 
 
 
A  step  forward  was made  in  1649  with  the  passing  of  an  act  entitled  “An  act  for  the  appointing 
Commissioners for the sale of Prize-goods” (NMM  1649, B7384 Laws, Statutes, etc.)   The act stated 
the names of 19 people who were authorised as commissioners, collectors and treasurers for the sale of 
prize goods, and contained instructions as for the storage and sale of such goods. For convenience the 
Act also abolished the use of Latin in hearings to speed up the procedure. “Thus did the English Prize 
Court become a properly constituted legal tribunal of far reaching commercial, financial, and 
international importance” (Kendall 1931, 69).  Prize goods in this case constituted “any ships, goods 
vessels, arms, ammunition, wares and merchandise whatsoever, and of what kind condition  etc., i.e. 
goods taken by ship in service of parliament or the King which by seizure or capture should lawfully 
belong  to  the  parliament or the  King, (depending  on  whether  it  was  during the  Commonwealth 
Interlude),  unless  the  Court of Admiralty  shall  (where  they  find  the  goods  perishable,  and  not 
preferable till sentence) make some order or decree for appraisement, and sale or delivery there-of, 
to the best advantage” (NMM 1649, B7384). 
 
 
The prize aspect of privateering is the single most important factor governing the motivation of these 
enterprising seamen.  Their  sole aim  was to plunder  an enemy’s  shipping for  financial gain  despite 
the political and  commercial harm (or  good  depending on  what angle  you  look  at it) it was  doing. 
During times of war the government would encourage private men-of-war because they added to the sea 
power of the country, without straining the resources of that nation.  Because the admiralty took a share 
in prizes, privateering could often increase its budget (or line the pockets of certain admirals). While  
the politicians strove  to increase  the power  of the state,  it seems  that merchants and seamen sought  
after  personal wealth  in a “seemingly symbiotic relationship” (Jan De Vries 1976,  239-240). Not 
only did this form of warfare increase wealth and keep state costs low but it also wore down and 
weakened the enemy’s trade and sea power. 
THE LAW OF PRIZE 
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At the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 18th century there was a considerable drop in 
the amount of piracy, especially in the Caribbean “because the Rule of Law was beginning to be 
maintained  by the exercise  of  naval  power”   but it  had by  no means  been removed  completely. 
(Kemp & Lloyd 1960, 75).  However this had no effect on privateering which continued to expand 
well into the 19th century, but only in a form that was very strictly governed by law and limited to a 
great extent in that very few commissions were issued.   This period of privateering bore little 
resemblance to that which took place in the 17th and 18th centuries.  Once into the 18th century this 
increase in prizes taken led the admiralty to believe that prize could be an important economic factor, 
and they began to treat the subject with more respect. 
 
 
The history of prize jurisdiction goes back as far as 1242, when England, under Henry III, was at war 
with France.  As was customary, he ordered the ships of the Cinque Ports to be fitted out against the 
enemy.  Henry ordered that the ships could keep all they captured apart from a fifth, which was the 
King’s due (NMM 1930, 88).  It was this that set the standard rate of “taxation” on prize goods for the 
future, although this system changed at various periods in history. 
 
 
It was not only privateers that took prize for profit, the Navy has, during certain periods, shared prize 
with the admiralty, and often it was the only way a naval officer could make any real money.   In 
1659, during King William’s war, a tenth part of enemy prize was supposed to be paid to the treasurer 
of the Navy;  this money was kept aside and used for the payment of “Medals and other rewards, for 
officers, mariners and seamen who should be found to have done any singal or extraordinary service” 
(NMM  1730, 104). 
 
 
In the Dutch war of 1664, encouragement was given to the privateers and Men-of-War alike in the 
form of a payoff for captured ships.  They were given ten shillings for every tun of captured ship, and 
6 pounds, 13 shillings and four pence for every piece of ordinance.  On top of this for every gun on a 
destroyed man-of-war, 10 pounds was offered (NMM 1730, 90)   However it was probable that the 
men would not have seen much of this money, while the officers lined their pockets. 
 
 
During the next Dutch war in 1672, the system had again changed, and this time a sum was given 
according to the amount of guns a captured or destroyed ship had.  For example, for a ship of 20-30 
guns the captors would have received 200 pounds, a ship of 50-60 guns was worth 800 pounds and 
that of 90 and upwards was worth 1200 pounds to the captors.   The regulation of this money meant 
that it would have again gone to the officers of the ship, not the crew.   The common men had to 
make do with the proceeds of the goods captured on board “upon or above the gun deck”, so long as 
it was not jewels, bullion or plate (NMM 1730, 90).  A rather unfair offer, one might feel.  But in 
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1686, during a war with Barbary, King James offered a proclamation that allowed captors all that 
they took, but later when the admiralty lacked money they reverted to the 1664 rules. 
 
 
During the 4th and 5th years of William III (1693) certain regulations concerning prize were made by 
Parliament.   These regulations had been in force for many years, abroad and at home, concerning 
privateers, but the new regulations encompassed men-of-war as well as privateers.   They stated that 
all  prizes  were  to  be  brought  into  port,  and  delivered  to  the  Commissioners  of  Prizes  to  be 
“condemned,  the goods sold and the Customs  paid” (NMM 1730,  91).  If the ship was taken by 
privateers, then four-fifths of the proceeds would go to the captors and one-fifth to the King, while 
“the ship and all her furniture belonged to the captors”. If the prize happened to be taken by a man- 
of-war, then only one-third of the goods went to the captors, while one-third went to the treasurer of 
the navy for care of injured seamen, and one-third went to the Crown.    It might seem  unjust that 
naval personnel received less prize money than privateers, but it must be remembered that privateers 
usually  agreed  to  serve  by  the  “no  prize,  no  pay”  rule,  while naval sailors  had  a  wage (albeit 
sporadic).     The government   had also to encourage private enterprise where men-of-war were 
concerned, as privateers were an important way of strengthening sea power, and by offering attractive 
prize percentages more ships would be fitted out and increase sea power of the state. Although ten 
pounds  per  gun  was  allowed  for  men-of-war,  pillage  was  forbidden,  unlike  the  rules  for  the 
privateers (NMM 1730, 92). 
 
 
This Act was rendered invalid at the Peace of Utrecht in1713, but during the war with Spain in 17I8, 
it was again put into force, apart from one or two minor articles, due to the admiralty being short of 
money. 
 
 
Again in 1702, £10 was offered to any privateers per gun on men-of-war destroyed.  It was this year 
that had seen the death of William III, and England declared war on France (Cook & Stevenson 
1988, 156).  It was therefore in the interest of the Government and the admiralty that they should 
encourage the use of privateers to weaken the enemy.  The war of the Spanish Succession lasted until 
peace was made in 1713 at the Treaty of Utrecht, during which time Marlborough made his crushing 
defeat of the French land forces while Admiral Sir John Leake defeated the French at Marbella, and 
Spanish territory was captured by the English fleet.  This period must have been a prosperous one for 
the English (and French) privateers, and probably letter of Marque ships as well, (more of which we 
shall see in a later chapter). 
 
 
In 1708, parliament had to issue a proclamation to solve the problems of who would receive prizes 
and in what order.  They decreed that a Captain of Marines shared with lieutenants and Master of the 
Ship; a marine lieutenant with the warrant officers and a sergeant of marines with the midshipmen 
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and petty officers.  This was not all they did in that year; the Prize Act of 1708 gave parliament and 
the admiralty unofficial control over the privateers. 
 
 
It removed power from the Crown to give discretionary power to grant Commissions to privateers. 
Because it removed the prize commissioners, it also stripped the Crown of power to dispose of prize 
goods, and it lost its power in the proceedings of the Prize Court (Pares 1938, 64-66).  This was an 
important act for it gave the admiralty much more freedom to exercise its power and put paid to any 
interfering royal proclamations. 
 
 
In the case of the quadruple alliance against Spain in 1718-20, a similar line of encouragement was 
given to the privateers who sought their fortune, but it seems only to have been extended to men-of- 
war, although this may have meant private men-of-war as well (NMM 1730, 98). 
 
 
During further conflict with Spain in 1729, a bill was passed that included an article for the “more 
effectual suppression of piracy”.  It was stated in this act that all prizes taken from the enemy should 
be given solely to the captors; again it seems that the admiralty had plenty of funds coming from 
elsewhere at the time and had no need for the extra money (NMM 1730, 93; NMM 1729, B1020). 
 
 
Prize adjudication was a very important aspect of t he  prize law process.  During the 18th century 
this jurisdiction was controlled by the admiralty courts.   During part of the 17th century there was 
only one place where prizes could be judged and this was the High Court of the Admiralty in 
London.  Ships taken overseas therefore had to be brought all the way back to England.   “Naturally 
neither governors nor privateers wanted this in the Caribbean, but neither did they wish illegal sales to 
keep down prices at the auctions of prizes, nor to find that ships could be arrested on their voyages 
because of imperfect titles” (Crump 1931, 97).  As a consequence, due to the cost of this journey 
many privateers did not bother to declare goods captured, which resulted in the goods not being 
legally theirs.  In 1626 this was changed to allow “outward bound merchantmen with letters of 
Marque” to take their prizes into foreign neutral ports (Pares 1938, 77).  By the end of the 17th 
century an admiralty court had been set up in Ireland, a number of vice-admiralty courts overseas, 
especially the East and West Indies, could be used for prize adjudication.   Admiralty courts were not 
necessarily prize courts, and were apparently only automatically so during periods of war (Pares 1938, 
78).  The prize courts were very important to the privateers in times of war.  Ships and goods 
captured had to be passed through the courts to make sale of the vessel legal.  Without a special 
certificate issued to the captors stating that the ship was legally theirs, and registration in the custom 
house, there was no way the ship and goods could be sold “such copy being as necessary as the 
conveyance writings of an Estate” and without these papers “the former proprietors may seize them 
wherever they find them, and they will be adjudged to them” (NMM 1730, 104). Goods that were 
sold before their declaration 
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to the prize courts were held against the law (“Bona Piratarum”) and were deemed to be the property 
of the Lord High Admiral (NMM 1730, l 05). 
 
 
Under normal circumstances, the Judge of the high Court of the Admiralty could not undertake the 
adjudication and condemnation of prizes without the authority of the King under a Commission of 
the great Seal. 
 
 
It was important that those admiralty courts authorised to deal with prize cases were to keep detailed 
accounts of sale of prize goods which were to be sent to the admiralty periodically.  This account was 
to be “given to the publick, when required; a n d  therefore when an exact list of all prizes taken is 
necessary to be known, send to the registrar for it” (Crump 1931, 95-98; NMM 1730, 108).   This 
was presumably to allow any ship-owner who felt he had been wronged, to check where, and t o  
whom, his ship had been sold, and secondly to discourage embezzlement of funds, both admiralty 
and public, by periodic check-ups.  There was, no doubt, a certain amount of corruption within the 
ranks of the courts that dealt with prize, and it seems probable that some “privateers” who did not 
have valid letters of Marque would be allowed to take prizes if they paid certain members of the 
courts or officers “a modest sum”.  Corruption even managed to get into this strict legal system. 
 
 
The court proceedings for prize cases went very much along the lines of criminal proceedings as we 
have seen in the chapter on the admiralty courts.  The first things that takes place in the court are the 
examinations,  “from  three  or  four  of  the  principle  persons  belonging   to  the  prize”.      These 
examinations were supposed to prove that either the ship or cargo was the property of the enemy 
(Berckman 1979, 6-8; NMM 1730, 109). The procedure now differs slightly from the criminal cases 
in that there is a section for the use of persons wishing to state a claim in either the ship or cargo. 
This is known as the citation.  “It is open to all manner or persons that have, or pretend to have, any 
right title or interest in the prize, to appear in the High Court of the admiralty on a certain day, then 
and there to show cause, if any they have, why the ship, her tackle  apparel and furniture and the 
 
goods taken therein should not be pronounced to belong at the time of capture to persons other than 
the King and not to be taken as good and lawful prize.”  Of course prizes were often unlawfully taken 
and were handed back to the original owners or the admiralty after the court hearing.  On the other 
hand the admiralty could lose prizes should a judge so decree.  For instance, the anonymous writer of 
the manuscript in the National Maritime Museum, c.1730 (NMM, 123; Pares 1938, 108-132) tells us 
of the British privateer that in 1704 captured a neutral ship laden with French wines in Weymouth 
Road.  The cargo was “condemned as perquisite of admiralty because she was seized in the road”, 
while the ship was returned to its rightful owners.  The captors were not too happy with the loss of 
their cargo, the value of which carne to over £2000, and applied to have the verdict reassessed, after 
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which  the  cargo  was  taken  from  the  admiralty   and  given  back  to  the  captors  (after  having  the 
admiralty one-tenth deducted). 
 
 
In  1711,  it  was  decreed  that  if the captain  of  an  English  privateer  or man-of-war came  across  an 
enemy  ship  and plundered it and  then afterwards allowed  the ship to go free  that  this “is little  less 
than treason and  corresponding with the King’s enemies.”  However  if the prize  was unseaworthy  to 
such an extent  that it would be impractical to bring  her back to port, or due to the extent  of damage 
she  would  be  difficult to sell,  then  the Commander might  have  taken  the  decision   to  ransom   the 
vessel. 
 
There  were also laws that were made to protect British  trade and goods from foreign  privateers, and 
to prevent  the capture  of those goods,  and  from  becoming the prize  of another  nation.    During  the 
reign of Charles II piracy  was having an adverse effect on “the  trade and navigation of England”. It 
had been noted in many cases that the ships had been allowed to be boarded without any attempt to 
defend themselves on behalf of the merchantmen.  As a result piracy took away a large proportion of 
the net profits, not only of the small trading companies, but also the large ones such as the East India 
Company and the Royal African Company (Cook & Wroughton 1980, 169-171; NMM 1726, 24-30). As a 
result  in  the 22nd  and 23rd  of Charles  II (1671)  Parliament passed  an act  entitled  “an  act to 
prevent  the  delivering   up  of  merchant  ships  and  the  encrease  of  good  and  serviceable shipping.” 
This act stated  that any  ship  of 200  tuns or upward  carrying  16 or more guns,  of which  the master 
does “yield  up the said goods to pirates without  fighting”  he was to be tried in the High Court  of the 
Admiralty  and banned  from  taking charge  of any ship as master or commander; if he did so he   was 
imprisoned for six months for each offence.  It was also stated that any seaman  who refused  to fight 
against  pirates  “shall  lose  his  wages  due  to him;  together  with  such  goods  he has  in the  ship  with 
him”.   Likewise “every  mariner  who  shall have  laid  violent  hands  on  his commander, whereby  to 
hinder him from fighting in defense of his ship and  goods committed  to his trust shall suffer death as 
a felon”  (NMM 1726, 24-30).  It was hoped that this would make  the crews of ships fight off pirate 
attacks  but  it  is  not known  whether  this act  had any  effect  in  the taking  of cargoes and  ships  by 
pirates  as illegal  prize.    It was usually  the case that  the crew  of a cargo  vessel  had  no stake  in  the 
cargo itself  and were only employed to take that cargo  to another  port.  As a result  the pirates  often 
appealed to  the  crews  not  to fight  and  that  if  they  did  not  they  would  not  be  mistreated.   The 
merchant  seamen  often  obeyed  the pirates  by allowing them on board to take  the cargo,  knowing  it 
would  be  the merchants that  lost  out,  and  not  themselves.   Why should they risk their lives for 
someone else’s cargo (Ritchie 1983, 11)? 
 
The evolution of the law of prize was a gradual process that seemed to respond to events as they 
happened.  By the end of the 18th century however, the system had grown old and defunct.  Prize 
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courts and officers were accused  of delayed distribution, under selling and corruption, among other 
things. 
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Privateers have been around, in a commercial sense, since about the 13th century and since that time 
the privateer  had need for some form of warrant or licence to distinguish  him from those detested 
criminals, pirates, and it would have been this licence that would have saved him from execution as 
such.  This  period  had  no  real  form  of  international  law  and  licences  were  given  to   private 
ship-owners to fit out vessels as men-of-war and to “compensate themselves for injuries suffered at the 
hands of a  foreign but  not  an  enemy  country”  (Kendall  1931, 4; Macintyre  1975,  1-4).  These 
licences were known as Letters of Marque (sometimes spelt Mart) or Reprisal.   The earliest known 
English letter of Marque comes from the reign of Henry III, dated February  1243 and its opening 
line is “Relative to annoying the King’s enemies” Claws 1897, Vol II).  This would suggest that their 
role,  as far  as  the  country  was concerned  was  to disrupt  enemy  trade routes  and  weaken  their 
merchant shipping.  But the last line read “and they are to render to the King, in his wardrobe, the 
half of their gain”.  So apart from providing the country with useful ferries and supplying the King 
with a substantial income, these privateers provided for themselves a viable commercial venture. 
There were two types of letter of Marque during the 17th and 18th centuries.  They were the General 
and Special Letter of Marque. Special letters of marque were basically   letters of Reprisal and to 
avoid confusion they have   been called letters of Reprisal in the past.  This however is slightly 
misleading, and I believe that it would be better to categorise Special and General Letters of Marque as 
such.   This is because the only thing that really separated the two were periods of warfare and 
periods of peace, as will be explained in due course.  Special letters of Marque were hard to come by. 
A ship-owner had to have a very good reason for obtaining one of these licences.  To obtain one the 
subject had to have been attacked and/or robbed by a foreign aggressor, whose country was not at 
war with England.   He must then have tried to receive compensation in the courts of that country 
“where if justice is denied or vexatiously delayed, he is to make proof of his losses in the admiralty 
 
court here” (NMM 1730, 56).  If the court was found to be satisfied that the claimant had gone about 
trying for compensation lawfully, then a letter of Reprisal was issued to him, against that nation, 
whether or not England was at war with them.  These Special letters remained  valid until the holder 
had “recovered  full  satisfaction  for their  injuries,  together  with costs in  getting it,  all  which  is 
ascertained  in the admiralty court” (NMM 1730, 57).   In this way personal grievances could be 
sorted out against foreign countries whilst at peace with them. 
 
General letters of Marque were issued upon or during a war with a foreign state, whereby the Lord 
High Admiral was empowered by the King to grant commissions to privateers, to fit out ships at their 
own cost “to annoy the enemy” hence a country’s sea power could be increased without burdening the 
national budget or the admiralty, whilst men made their fortunes through this hazardous occupation 
and supplied the admiralty and Crown with an additional income.  Everyone a winner! 
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These letters of Marque were often all that stood between the holders being privateers or pirates, in 
all probability letters of Marque did not even do that as corrupt officials may have issued letters of 
Marque for a fee, and often their behaviour was very similar.  Not only would a ship carry a letter of 
Marque but also the way that a privateer conducted itself could be subject to rules laid down in the 
regulations of the letter of Marque.   By overstepping these rules, the privateers could, at worst, be 
treated as pirates and executed, or at best lose all the prizes that they took to the original owners.  An 
example of Special instructions for letters of Marque comes from 1637 in a declaration of Charles I 
that stated that “noe violence   shall be done to the persons of the french subjects, excepte in case of 
resistance.   And after [their] blood hath byn spilled, the hurte or wounded shal be used with all 
convenient offices of humanity and kindness”  (Berckman 1979, 117). 
 
In 1603 at the start of James I ’ s reign, there was a sudden drop in the amount of letters of 
Marque issued, indeed  it is possible that none  were issued at  all during his reign.    He apparently 
totally refused to issue letters of Marque under any circumstances.   As C.M. Senior has observed: 
“James was a Scot with little appreciation of the concept of privateering, which to him seemed to be 
not far removed from piracy”. There was, indeed, considerable support for such a view.  The main 
aim of privateers - the acquisition of booty - was the same as that of pirates.  The only difference 
between the two was that the privateer’s depredations were supposed to be governed by the limits of 
his commission: in practice, however, many privateers acted no better than pirates, “pursuing their 
booty at will and committing spoils which would never be justified by their commissions.” (Senior 
1976, 8). 
 
In 1629, the adventurous Earl of Warwick was commanding privateers for profit.   He was given a 
Special letter of Marque in this year “to recover his losses against the King of Spain, his subjects, or 
the subjects of any prince or potentate which is not in league and enmity with us, or who shall not be 
during the said whole voyage” (Kendall 1931, 64).  This commission gives the Earl of Warwick an 
abnormally wide scope for a letter of Marque, especially a Special Commission, and it is undoubtedly 
his rank (he was Lord High Admiral at the time) and proximity to the King, that allowed him such 
comparatively unrestricted privateering.  He was later to be involved with the construction of the first 
English ‘frigate’,  which he helped finance and which had been copied from a French privateer, and 
was subsequently named “The Constant Warwick”, the money for which probably came from his 
privateering exploits.  Had the Commission not come from such a high authority this episode might 
have been bordering on corruption. 
 
Although James’ reign ended in 1625, his doctrine concerning privateering seems to have held sway 
into Charles’ reign, and despite the Earl of Warwick’s ventures, it was not until 1634 that any real 
revival of privateering took place, and letters of Marque were issued against the French and Spanish. 
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Although Charles Wye Kendall (1931, 65) states that both special and general commissions were 
issued, it is more likely that only special letters were issued. When one considers that peace had been 
made with Spain and France 4 and 5 years earlier, respectively (Cook & Wroughton 1980, 155). 
 
But it is in this year (1634) that the important definition between letters of Marque and letters of 
reprisal is first made. From this point onward it was essential that the applicant for a Special letter of 
Marque had proof of loss, and as a result it became increasingly difficult to obtain such a licence 
(Kendall 1931, 65).   It would not be until the restoration that obtaining a ‘vendetta licence’ would 
become common practice again.  But in 1638 four years after this distinction had been made, English 
ships were being piratically  taken to be used by  the French Navy against  the Spaniards, and as a 
result Special letters of Marque were issued against the Duke d’Espernon  who had been conducting 
the thefts (NMM 1730, 56). 
 
An Act of Parliament was passed in 1649 stating, once again, that those who had been wronged by 
foreign states should receive Special letters of Marque.  However the act received little use and few 
letters were granted as a result.  It was evident that this method of receiving compensation for private 
losses was receiving less attention than in the past (Kendall 1931, 68).  The reason for this is perhaps 
that international law had produced a fairer system for dealing with compensation to those of another 
nation who claimed for damages. 
 
By 1645 New England privateers were being issued letters of Marque, not from England but from 
their own General Councils, to privateers who would sail against the enemies of the New World, such as 
the Turkish pirates who had been disrupting New England trade.  But letters of Marque were still 
being sent across the Atlantic upon the outbreak of wars. In 1653 four letters were sent to Boston due 
to the outbreak of the first Anglo-Dutch War, which was the result of the Navigations Act of 1651 
(Kendall 1931, 77; Cook & Wroughton  1980, 155).   By 1666 England was at war with Holland, 
France and Denmark.  As a result English merchants trading with the Hanse towns wanted letters of 
Marque so that they could supplement their trade profits. The Admiralty decided to send a number of 
blank General letters of Marque for Sir William Swan, the Ambassador for England in Hamburg, to 
issue as he felt was required.  In the next century, Sir Henry Penrice, Judge of the High Court of the 
Admiralty (1715 - 1751) opposed this practice and had it stopped. 
 
In the same year it was decided that letters of Marque could be used for security in the payment of 
loans and  in lieu  of  the payment  of  the King’s  l0th or 15th of  prizes  taken  (NMM 1730,  66). 
Commissions were often revoked when letters of Marque were misused.   One such case in 1665 
occurred when a number of English captains of ships tried to supplement their incomes by ransoming 
ships they had captured without bringing them into any port, and even did so to ships of nationalities 
England was not at war with, and this was strictly against their instructions with their letters of 
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Marque.   This practice was doing the British authorities no good as far as international relations 
went, and it was in their interest to revoke the licences and proceed against the scandalous captains in 
the Admiralty Court.  Captains could also be reprimanded and have commissions revoked for ‘injust 
seizures’  and for showing cruelty  to  the crew of a captured  vessel, which happened  to a Captain 
Holman, for his seizure of a Swedish vessel  in 1692 (NMM 1730, 7).  The instructions that were to 
go with letters of Marque were issued by the King under his signet and were sent to the Lord High 
Admiral   “to be observed by such who have letters of Marque or Commissions for private men-of- 
war. During the war of the Quadruple Alliance with Spain” (1718-1720) they ran thus (Cook & 
Stevenson 1988, 159): 
 
“1.         To take the Enemys  ships and  goods and  other vessels and  goods liable  to confiscation, 
according to the treaties between England and other states, but to commit no hostilities within the 
harbours of Princes in amity nor in their rivers or roads within shot of their cannon. 
 
2.           To seize all ships of what nation so ever carrying contraband goods to the enemy. 
 
 
3.           To carry all prizes into some port of the King’s dominions, to be adjudged in the admiralty’s 
 
Courts; but in the Mediterranean they carry them into the ports of any prince in amity or alliance. 
 
 
4.           When  a  prize is brought  into  port, to send  some of the  principle  company of the  prize, 
whereof  the  master and  pilot to  be always  two  as likewise  the ships  papers to  the  judge of  the 
admiralty to be examined. 
 
5.        The goods of the prize to be preserved ‘till judgement is passed in the admiralty.  Not to kill 
anybody in cold blood, nor treat them cruelly in forfeiture of the Commission. 
 
6.        Not to do or attempt anything against treaties or against the subjects of friends, but only 
against the enemy, and ships liable to confiscation. 
 
7.          After condemnation, they may disperse of these prizes as the y think fit. 
 
 
8.        To aid and assist ships of subjects or allies in distress. 
 
 
9.           All adventurers conforming to these articles shall be under the King’s protection. 
 
 
10. Before taking out a commission, to deliver into the admiralty office or Court of Admiralty, a 
description of the shipowners etc. that the same may be registered in the Admiralty Court. 
 
11.         To correspond constantly with the Admiralty and give the secretary  from time to time an 
account of their proceedings, and what Intelligence they learn of the enemy. 
LETTERS OF MARQUE AND REPRISAL 
22 
 
 
 
 
12.  Not to wear the King’s Colours, but colours  particular to letters of Marque, one third of 
their company to be landsmen. 
 
13.         To observe all such instructions that the King shall send them. 
 
 
14.         Such  as violate  these  instructions,  shall  be  punished, and  make  full  satisfaction  to  all 
persons injured. 
 
15.         To give £3000 bail if the ship carries above 150 men; £1500 if a lesser number, to pay the 
tenths of the Lord High Admiral” (NMM 1730, 61-3). 
 
Prior to 1695 it was standard that one third of a ship’s company should be landsmen.  As to what was 
actually  construed   to  be  a  landsman  was, one  would  imagine,  a  fairly  arbitrary  matter,  but 
presumably would represent any man who was not accustomed to life aboard a ship.  In this year an 
order of council was made that stated that one half of landsmen should make up the crew of a 
privateer (NMM 1730, 66).   This order stood well into the next century and, as C.W. Kendall has 
observed,  “strangely  enough,  does not  appear  to  have  diminished  either  seamanship  or  fighting 
powers of the privateers” (Kendall 1931, 153).   But on the other hand as one 18th century English 
admiral declared: “No men fight so well as those which fight for a fortune” (NMM 1726, 47), be they 
landsmen or seamen.  There was, of course, an ulterior motive for putting forward so many landsmen 
for service, in one form or another, at sea.  This was so that after the newcomers had been at sea for 
“a voyage or two”, they would be “fit  for His Majesty’s  Service” and could  be pressed into a life 
aboard  a man-of-war, rather  than having the Navy’s standards drop  by pressing ‘land lubbers’ into 
service. 
 
By the beginning of the 18th century, the Admiralty believed it was important that privateers should 
be able to be distinguished from men-of-war, despite the fact that privateers were often only armed 
with 20 or 30 light cannon, while men-of-war had as many as 100 large pieces.   As a result in 1701 
an article  was added to the instructions to Governors of colonies, that stated that ships which have 
been granted commissions as privateers should “wear a jack with a white escutcheon in the middle” 
(NMM 1730, 72).  No reason is given as to why this should be, but it seems probable that the division 
was made so that any privateers acting out of instructions or piratically could not be mistaken as 
men-of-war, and a slur made on the Royal Navy’s good (?) name.   Three years later this order was 
taken even further. 
 
In 1704 an instruction was given to ships carrying letters of Marque not to wear the union jack when 
in the company of Royal Navy men-of-war, or when in the proximity of any foreign men-of-war, or 
when in part.   The reason for this was to prevent the men-of-war thinking that the privateer was a 
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Royal Navy ship and so saluting that vessel (NMM 1740, 72; Kendall 1931, 156-7).   There must 
have been a few red faces when mistakes were made before this instruction was issued. 
 
In 1706, during the war of the Spanish succession, commissions were granted to foreigners “to cruise 
against the common enemy” provided that they adhered to the limitations and instructions issued with 
the letters of Marque.  It seems that all the help that could be mustered was needed at this time.  By 
way of tightening its grip on privateering  the government issued additional instructions in 1744 that 
threatened  privateers  with  the  revoking  of  their  commissions  if  they  should  break  any  of  the 
instructions whatsoever. 
 
It is at the beginning of the 18th century that we see a new era of ‘privateering’ emerge.  Perhaps it 
should not strictly be called privateering, and, I think, that ‘opportunism’ might be a better word for 
this branch of our studies.  The trading vessels of the large shipping companies, such as the East and 
West India Companies, had always been encouraged to defend themselves against pirates and enemy 
privateers and  men-of-war as we can see from some of the Acts of Parliament  passed  to prevent 
masters from ‘delivering up’ their ships to pirates and to encourage them  to fight off enemies.    It 
seems that this encouragement did not work particularly well and so it became standard practice for 
armed trading vessels to carry General letters of Marque (by this stage Special letters of Marque 
were not authorised or issued). 
 
This is the view of Charles Wye Kendall (1931, 156) and Evelyn Berckman (1979, 113-7).  But there 
is evidence that runs contrary to their observations.  There is a paragraph in the 1730 manuscript of 
the National Maritime Museum (77) dated January 7 -February 17 1712, that is an extract from a 
letter of a certain Dr Bramston to a Mr Burchett that runs thus: 
 
“You are not to grant commissions of Marque or Reprisals against any prince or state or their 
subjects in amity with us to any person whatsoever, without our special command.” 
 
This would imply that Special letters of Marque were still being issued at this time, but that stricter 
controls were starting to be used in their granting. 
 
The carrying of general letters of Marque seemed to work by encouraging the crew to deal effectively 
with pirates or privateers when attacked in the hope of a share of the prize.  These ships however did 
not go out of their way to look for prizes and so cannot be called privateers, but as their captains held 
Letters of Marque- to prevent them from being treated as pirates - they are generally called “Letter 
of Marque ships”. 
 
The letter of Marque continued to be used throughout the 18th century in the same manner as had 
been slowly established in the last century.  Letter of Marque ships continued to cruise with an eye 
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open to the possibility of making a fortune by taking a rich prize, while privateers continued to cruise 
as predators.  It was through the letter of Marque that the government was able to keep control of the 
privateers by issuing instructions and without a valid letter no privateer could legally take prize.  In 
1708 a statute was made that provided that the admiralty should issue out letters of Marque to any 
who should apply for one.  This was a mistake, and continued to cause problems, by having neutrals 
attacked by British privateers until the privateers act was made in 1759, which recognised that there 
were  problems  with  the smaller  privateers,  and  so  set  out  discretionary  rules  as  to  the size  of 
privateers allowed, in this case they had to be over 100 tons carrying 10 guns, and have more than 40 
crew members (32 George II) “as long as the government was free to grant  commissions, it  was free 
to revoke them”. (Pares 1938, 46), and in this way the government was able to keep a tight grip on the 
events of privateering in the 18th century. 
 
The letter of Marque has seen a long history, and it came to be viewed as the symbol of legality 
concerned with privateering.  The letter remained important to the privateer until the 19th century as 
the line that drew the distinction between legality and piracy, and as a result the line between his 
profession and death on the gallows.  As the 18th century progressed the rules issued with letters of 
Marque were made stricter and more confining, and the number of these commissions issued grew 
fewer and fewer.   The  Privateers  Act of 1759  was instigated  because of  the  many  breaches  of 
instructions which meant that neutral parties were being attacked, and recognised the need to show 
discretion in the issuing of these letters, and control was  exercised by the Crown and the Admiralty 
to reduce the piratical attacks of neutral countries  by offending privateers.  Although privateering 
continued in a restricted form the heyday of British privateering had drawn to a close. 
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Prior to the Statute of the 28th year of Henry VIll  (1537) those crimes  committed upon the sea, or in 
the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, were  tried in  the  High Court  of  the Admiralty  in London, which 
was complementary to the course of the Civil Laws of England. As the amount of crimes committed, 
that fell into the hands of the admiralty increased, it became too much of a burden on the High Court of 
the Admiralty to deal with these crimes.  After  1537 it was decreed  that  those crimes  would  be tried 
in  the vice-admiralty courts  under  a Commission of Oyer  and  Terminer.   This  was a special 
commission given to Judges, and in this case  the vice-admiralty judge, to deal with “treasons, 
piracies, felonies, etc.” as far as the admiralty was concerned  those which  were “committed upon the 
sea, or in any haven, river, creek or place where the Admiral has jurisdiction”  (NMM 1730,  25). 
Four  persons  had to be present  to make  up a  court  to carry out a trial by Oyer  and Terminer, and 
these  could  be  made  up from  the Lords  of  the  Admiralty, the  members  of  the  Privy  Council, the 
Chancellor of  the  Admiralty  and  the judges,  the Lords  of  the Treasury  and  Commissioners of  the 
Navy,  the Aldermen  of  London  and  doctors  of  the  Civil  Law.     These  were  all  members  of  the 
Commission and  any four  of  them  made  up a Court.  A jury  would  have been  summoned as  well 
from  the surrounding towns and ports  of  the county, by the Sheriff,  to site  at  the hearings.   These 
trials  were  usually  held  on  the county  basis  or  within  the jurisdiction of  the  vice-admiralty.   The 
commissions were  apparently handed  out  to all  the counties  of England  to the judges  that  “go  the 
circuit”, that  is,  travel  around   the  different towns  in  their  jurisdiction  to  hold  trials,  under  the 
commission of Oyer and Terminer. 
 
 
Since  1537  it  had been  standard  practice to bring  those committing piracy  back  to England  to be 
tried, but as this had proved  costly  and  troublesome, a statute  was passed  in Parliament in the l1th 
and  12th  year of William  III (1699) entitled “an act for the more effectual suppression of piracy”. 
This act stated that all piracies felonies and robberies in places remote to England (i.e. the Colonies) 
could be tried in any place either at sea or on the land “in any of His Majesty’s islands, plantations, 
dominions, forts or factories, to be appointed for that purpose by the King’s Commission under the 
great or Admiralty Seal.”  This Court could be held by “any Admirals, Judges of Vice-Admiralties  or 
commanders of ships of war or any other persons whom the King shall appoint’’ and “Commissioners 
shall have full  power, or any one of them, to  commit  to safe  custody  any  person  against  whom 
information  shall be given upon oath and to call and assemble a Court of Admiralty, which shall 
consist of seven persons at least.”  If seven such persons could not be found then three commissioners 
could assemble persons of their choosing t o  make up  the numbers. (NMM 1700, Bl013).    It was 
stated in the Act that “due to the cost of bringing them (pirates) to justice their numbers have recently 
increased.”  Trade and navigation in the East and West Indies tended to suffer when piracy got out of 
hand and this act was an attempt to  deal with troublemakers on the spot.  It is interesting that the 
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Statute of 1537 indicates the crimes as “Treasons, felonies, robberies, murders  and confederacies” 
while the 1699  Act states  only “piracies,  felonies  and  robberies”,  presumably  even  by  the later 
Statute this would mean that treason, homicide and confederacies would have to have been tried in 
England. 
 
It seems that in crimes other than piracy, the Special Commission of Oyer and Terminer  was used only  
in  exceptional  cases, such  as  exemplary   hangings or  trials  to  deter  other  criminals  from 
following  in the footsteps of their comrades.   For example, t h i s  method was used to suppress the 
peasants’ revolt in 1381 (Bellamy 1773, 95) and indicates that local Justices cannot deal with such 
situations where it is used.  It was also used for dangerous offences, and piracy presumably comes 
into this category.    The Commission was often petitioned for by Gentlemen, in counties wh e r e  
popular criminals (Highwaymen, Smugglers and perhaps even Pirates?) were getting out of hand and 
“verged on insurrection against their authority”  (Hay et al. 1975, 31).  From this evidence it would 
seem that piracy was taken seriously enough to have this special commission used against it all the 
time, not only when it got out of hand. As to whether or not it was an effective weapon against piracy 
it is difficult to say, but there is little doubt that many pirates were hung after trial by Oyer and 
Terminer. 
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Piracy was a capital offence during the 17th and 18th centuries, and hanging was the usual method of 
ridding society of these detested criminals.  But the gallows were by no means the only method by 
which pirates were  executed.    There  were  a  number  of  gruesome  methods  that  were  used in 
executions, which ranged from peine forte et dure   (pressed to death)  to being drowned.   If pirates 
were lucky they might have got away with being publicly whipped or flogged, and some pirates even 
managed to get away scot-free due to surprising clemency during their trials.   Straight piracy was 
usually followed by whipping, imprisonment or hanging, but with piracy complicated by murder, 
violence or cruelty, the sentence was  invariably death.    Pirates  were able  to get  away  without 
punishment  if  the  jury  could  not come  to a  decision  or  if  there  was  not  enough  evidence  to 
substantiate a conviction (Berckman 1979, 36-52). 
 
There were a number of areas where the hanging of pirates took place, and these are usually in the 
very heart of where the sailors stayed when on land, such as near wharfs and docks, and lining the 
banks of ports.  Hanged pirates were sketched by the famous, cartoonist Thomas Rowlandson in the 
Docklands of East London, the Isle of Dogs (Hay 1975, 644-5) and the Wapping and Southwark 
banks of the Thames were renowned for their public hangings and one dock at Wapping carried the 
name “Execution D o c k ”. (Senior 1976, 104).  Most hang ings  were treated as public spectacles, 
especially in the larger cities such as London, Manchester and Edinburgh, which served to deter other 
criminals from committing crimes by showing the pointlessness of breaking the King’s laws and the 
state flexed its muscles in a display of staged inhumanity.  The condemned man was usually allowed 
to  make a  last  speech  to  the crowd  that  would  have  assembled  to  watch  the event,  which  the 
authorities  hoped would  be  a confession  and  denunciation  or  the criminal’s  evil  ways while  he 
warned any would be pirate to steer clear of robbery at sea.  Because these executions were done on 
an essentially local nature, that is seamen were hanged at docks and wharfs, while housebreakers 
were hanged in urban areas and highwaymen were strung up along the roads - it was hoped that they 
would have a strong social effect on the local community and act as a “spectacular reminder of the 
power of the State” (Sharp 1983, 142). One such execution of a sea-surgeon, although not for piracy, 
demonstrates  that  the  social  effect  can  be  quite  effective  when  “some  thousands  of  sorrowful 
spectators” turned up for his execution and he denounced  his sinful way of life and gave a moral 
warning to those gathered there (the true narrative of the Execution of John Marketman, Chyrurgian, 
of Westham  in  the  County  of Essex,  for committing  a  horrible and  bloody  Murder  (1680,  3-4). 
Hanging was by far the most widely used method of execution during the 17th and 18th centuries in 
England but there is another method that needs mentioning (Beckman 1979, 53). 
 
Peine Forte et Dure m u s t  surely have been a worse fate than the gallows.  This method of execution 
involved being pressed to death.   Luckily, this technique was reserved almost exclusively for those 
defendants that refused to plead one way or the other.  What is puzzling is that they surely must have 
28 
 
 
A PUNISHMENT TO FIT THE CRIME 
 
 
known what fate would be in store for them if they did not plead, and yet they chose to endure a 
painful  and  slow  death,  rather  than  the  comparative  swiftness  of  hanging,  presumably  out  of 
“principle”. 
 
There  are  a  number of  cases  in  the High  Court  of  Admiralty  (HCA)  records  where defendants 
accused of piracy refused to plead one way or the other.   An example of the sentence to be passed on 
two pirates, Philip Ward and William Harvye, captured by a renowned pursuer of pirates, Charles, 
Earl of Nottingham,  in 1605. Few of Charles’ victims got away after a court hearing: 
 
“for p i r a t i c a l  depredations, spoil, rapine  and  murder of  Nicholas Zouch  and  William  
Pope, Merchants: a hole shall be dug in which their (Harvye and Ward) respective bodies shall lie 
naked and shall be weighed down with stones and as heavy as can be.  And while they live they may 
have the worst bread and water of that prison, neither clean nor running. And on the day they drink 
they may not eat, and on the day they eat they may not drink” (HCA 1-5-75).  No doubt many 
confessions were brought about in this manner. 
 
After the accession  of James Stuart  there seems to have been a gradual  trend in English law that 
made  capital   punishment  more  selective,  so  that  criminals   convicted  of  capital  crime   were 
increasingly  being given corporal punishments, two of the most numerous of which were whipping 
and branding. It seems evident that the death penalty was used in cases where discretion on behalf of 
the judges deemed it necessary, either to be used on “appropriate occasions, or inflicted on what 
were felt to be appropriate criminals: the majority of those convicted for capital offences were, in 
fact, escaping with lesser penalties” (Sharpe 1983, 144).  It is difficult to know why there is a “post- 
Elizabethan”  leniency  toward capital  offences, but  it is  possible  that  the legal fraternity  became 
aware  that a harsh policy toward the common people and the excessive  use of capital punishment 
might have been ‘counterproductive’.  It is not known to what extent this affected the convictions of 
pirates, but there were several instances in the 17th and 18th centuries where pardons were given to 
pirates collectively, on the pretext that they would give themselves up: “sometimes it is practised in 
England and other countries to issue out proclamations allowing 12 or 18 months time to their 
subjects (pirates) to come in and receive pardon. The French did so in 1719” (NMM 1730, 11). 
 
One of the most interesting features of the law courts up until 1705 was the concept of ‘Benefit of 
Clergy’.  This was a method by which many criminals escaped the death penalty up until the loophole 
was blocked off.   It had stemmed  from an ancient form of ecclesiastical  privilege during the 12th 
century struggle between the Church and the State, out of which developed the right of the Church to 
try clerks accused of felony.  When this right was extended to secular clerks in 1350 the initial test of 
clerical status was rendered invalid, and from that point onward benefit of clergy was extended to the 
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public, and as proof of clerical status, the ability to read was adopted (Sharpe 1983, 24).  This meant 
that if the defendant could prove that he could read, usually by quoting a passage from the Old 
Testament,  he could very often reduce his punishment from capital  to corporal, so instead of being 
hung he would perhaps be branded or “openly whipped on their backs till their bodies bee bloody” 
(P.R.O. ASSI 35/96/1/1).  This system was in use until an Act of 1706 (5 Anne C.6), which abolished 
the literacy test (McLynn 1989, xi). 
 
One would have thought, therefore that there must have been a number of pirates that would have 
escaped  the  death  penalty, especially  when one  considers  that  approximately  75%  of  merchant 
seamen were literate (Rediker  1987, 307).   However when one examines the Statutes further, they 
show that the law courts were not going to let so contemptuous a criminal get away so lightly.   An 
Act dated 1649, entitled “an act for the punishment of crimes committed upon the sea” (NMM 1649, 
E555), clearly  states: “and  any  such  person or  persons so found  guilty of  any  crime  or  crimes 
aforesaid by verdict, confession or process, shall without allowance of benefit of clergy suffer such 
punishment by pains of death.” 
 
So pirates were exempt from this privilege, and, indeed, there was a whole list of crimes such as 
highway robbery, which were either originally “non-clergyable” or had been made “non-clergyable”. 
This shows a certain loathing of piracy among the established classes in Britain, while piracy 
remained, during certain periods, a “popular” crime, (i.e.  it  appealed  to  the public  and  was  usually 
aimed against  the  rich)  and  yet  the  courts  showed  leniency  toward crimes  such  as  rape.  There  
were obviously some strange attitudes towards morality during this period of history. 
 
As the punishment and pressure against piracy was stepped up in the 18th century it had a rather 
negative effect and turned out to be counter-productive for a while.   The bitter struggle against the 
pirates made them only mo re  anti-establishment.    Robert  C. Ritchie  (1986,  18)  sums  up  their 
retaliation well: 
 
“In turn the pirates became more fiercely antisocial.  They refused to take married men into the crew, 
they tortured all captured captains and merchants, unless the crew vouched for them as good men 
(any  harsh  captain  was  killed),  and they  changed  the traditional  bloody,  or red,  flag,  for  flags 
displaying  skulls, bones,  symbols  of  passing time,  and weapons.  The skull and crossbones was 
particularly significant because it was usually displayed to indicate that a death had occurred on 
board.  The pirates were prepared to wage a bitter and bloody struggle against the societies that had 
rejected them”. 
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During the 17th and 18th centuries there were a number of treaties made, between Britain and other 
neighbouring countries, which concerned piracy in one way or another, either directly or indirectly. 
These were made for a number of reasons, which could be that the pirates of one country could have 
been affecting the  trade of another, or it could have  been a mutual effort on behalf  of the two 
countries to rid the seas of pirates and to “give them no quarter”. One such treaty was made on 29 
August, 1610, entitled “A  Treaty of  Alliance between  great Britain and France, concluded in 
 
London”, between James I and Louis XIII.  It starts off by reconfirming past treaties still in force at 
that time and states that the new treaty “is not meant in any sort to depart from the preceding treaties 
and alliances” (Admiralty 1803, 6; Cook & Wroughton 1980, 160).  There are a number of Articles 
within this treaty that deal with aspects of piracy that were believed to be having an adverse effect on 
the two countries’ trade, and to restore a “Safe and free commerce”.  Article XXXIII ran thus: 
 
“That all the goods which shall be taken by the captains, and other officers of the one or the other 
prince, from pirates, shall be brought respectively to some port of the one or other Kingdom, and 
there put under good and safe custody of the admiral, vice-admiral, or other officers of the said 
ports; which officers shall be bound to answer for the said goods in their own name.”  and in this way 
these goods of the Navies of both France or Britain could be reclaimed by the said country.   But the 
next Article takes this even further: 
 
“That all goods which shall be thus taken and recovered from pirates, whether they are in gold or 
silver money, or other merchandises appertaining to the subjects of either of the said Kings, shall be 
rendered and restored to the true owners and proprietors without any delay, they having first made 
legal proof of the property thereof” 
 
Thereby if a British merchant had lost goods and could prove that they were his property he could 
claim those goods back even if they were in a French port;   and vice versa.  Presumably this treaty 
would have held good until after James I’s death when a shipping dispute broke out in April 1626 and 
precipitated a war with France (Cook & Wroughton 1980, 155).   This was carried on until 1629 
when  a  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  Susa  between  Charles  I  and  Louis  XIII,  that  vowed  to 
“inviolably” preserve the “ancient alliances between the two crowns and open a safe and free 
commerce” (Admiralty 1803, 7; Cook & Wroughton 1980, 161). 
 
While England was under the control of Cromwell’s Commonwealth, a treaty was made, again with 
France in November 1655.   Entitled “Treaty of Peace between Oliver Cromwell , Protector of the 
Republic of  England, and the  King of France ,  concluded at Westminster”. It was concerned 
primarily with the conduct of prize-ships and stated that the sea-commanders of either party were not 
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to damage the ships and merchandises of the other.  This could have been due to the supports of the 
Monarchy having established  themselves along  the coastline of Europe, including France,  and were 
sending out privateers or pirates to attack Commonwealth ships, while in retaliation those 
Commonwealth ships were mistakenly attacking French merchant and naval shipping.  But the most 
important passage, as far as we are concerned, comes from Article XIX and states “that neither of the 
Confederates shall receive any pirates or robbers into any of their ports, havens, cities or towns;  nor 
shall they permit them to be received by any people or inhabitants, or to be harboured, assisted, or 
supplied;  but  shall  use  their  endeavours,  that  such  pirates  and  robbers,  and  their  piratical 
accomplices, partners and assistants, shall be pursued, apprehended, and duly punished, for a terror 
to others”   (Admiralty 1803, 15).  The article goes on to say, in a rather lengthy manner, that ships 
and merchandise piratically taken were to be restored. 
 
This treaty is related to a letter (NMM 1649, 603/3) of 14 August 1649 from one John Bradshawe, 
who was at  that  time Chancellor  of the Duchy of  Lancaster  (Cook  &  Wroughton  1980,  16) and 
apparently  president of the Council of State,  addressed  to  a certain Coll. Popham  who appears to 
have  been  one  of  the first  lords of  the Admiralty  from  February  1649  to  July  1660  (Cook  & 
Wroughton 1980, 15).  The letter informs Popham of the loss of British shipping that is taking place 
in the North Sea due to “pyratts” putting out from Ostend, and the ports of Flanders.   Bradshaw 
required Popham to “give order to two such ships that you shall judge fit for that service to ply off 
and on upon the Coast of Flanders to prevent the coming out of those pyratts, or else intercept them 
when they returne thither with their prizes.”  Bradshaw goes on to tell Popham that this service will 
be a “greate  security to the ordinary trade between this  place and Flanders.”     In all probability, 
these “pyratts” that Bradshaw mentions are in fact privateers commissioned by  the executed king’s 
son, later to become Charles II, or his supporters  to  harass the trade of the Commonwealth.    It is 
known that Cromwell made little use of the Navy to curb illegal trade and pirates and as a result the 
commerce  of  England  suffered  during  the  days  of  the  interregnum,  and  French  (and  
Netherlands) privateers,  especially  from  Dunkirk,  harassed  the  trade and  navigation of  Britain.    It 
seems that  Popham’s efforts to deter or ‘intercept’ the Ostend privateers had little effect and as a 
result, six years later, England had to make a treaty (1655) with France to help lessen the strain they 
were having on British shipping. 
 
In May 1667 a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Madrid, in which it stated in Article 
XIII “it shall be lawful for ships of either Confederate....to enter into any neighbouring port....being 
forced by stress of weather or danger of pirates....Provided she is not bound for an enemies port with 
....Contraband”    (Admiralty 1803, 115). 
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During  the reign  of James II another  treaty of  peace  was made  with France  in  November  1686 
(Admiralty 1803, 31). It had the usual “neither party to molest the other” type of theme to it, but was 
also concerned with either side’s privateers,  and indeed, pirates.   Article XII stated that if the other 
party’s men-of-war or privateers damaged the goods of the other nation “they shall be punished, and 
be moreover compelled to satisfy all costs and damages.”   Article XIV went on to state that both 
kings should “give no assistance or protection to any pirates,  of whatever nation they are, nor suffer 
them to have any retreats in the roads or ports of the respective governments.”  In Article XV was a 
clause concerning the Colonies, and this stated that “No subjects of either king shall apply for or take 
any commission or letters  of mart  for arming any  ship or  ships to  act as  privateers in  America, 
whether Northern or Southern, from any prince or state, with which the other shall be at war;  and if 
any person shall take such letters of mart, he shall be punished as a pirate”. This basically stated that 
any help given to either the enemies of France or England by the other signatory was a breach of 
treaty and so the offending ship’s crews could be tried as pirates.  As a result, governments exercised 
a little more discretion in the issuing of commissions to privateers. 
 
In 1713 perhaps the most important treaty of this period was signed.   It was the treaty of Utrecht 
signed by Britain, France and Spain and the Netherlands.   The French ceded Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, S t   Kitts  and  the  Hudson  Bay  territory  to  England,  and   undertook  to  demolish   the 
fortifications at Dunkirk, also they recognised the Protestant Succession, and agreed not to help the 
Stuarts  (Cook  & Stevenson  1988, 157).    This  new  peace  had  the  effect  of  allowing  moves  to 
discourage piracy by instigating civil government in the Bahamas and renewing the commissions for 
the trial  of  pirates  (Steele  1968, 157).  A  new  concerted  effort  by  the  Navy, especially  in  the 
Caribbean after the Treaty of Utrecht led to a lessening of piracy, as each war (in the past) had been 
followed by a new outbreak, which was in fact the privateers returning to their peace-time profession 
(Pares  1938, 434).   Another  rash of  piracy  was expected  at  the end  of  the War of  the Austrian 
Succession (1739 - 1748) but the efforts by the Board of Trade and the Navy, coupled with the long 
peace that had followed the war of the Spanish Succession  (1718 - 1720) had succeeded in reducing 
much of  the piracy that  had been endemic  for so  long. 
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So now we have seen various aspects of law during the 17th and 18th centuries, what conclusions can 
we come to?   We have seen that the law responded to both privateering and piracy while being 
governed by the different political attitudes during this period. 
 
Piracy  went through periods of popular appeal and disinterest, so  that one era’s hero, while being 
hanged at Wapping, might not have the least bit of attention paid to him a few years after “his time”. 
The Government’s view toward piracy also changed and for almost a century any attempts against it 
were half hearted and mostly ineffective.    It was not until the end of the 17th century when the 
problem was getting out of hand that real efforts were made.   The Government sent spies, such as 
Edward Randolf to the Colonies to report on the activities of pirates and privateers (NMM 1696, 
GOS/9).  In his report he added a number of “remedies for Suppressing Pyrates”.   As his very f”rrst 
remedy  he proposed “that no person be made Governor in any of the proprieties, until he be first 
approv’d of by his Majesties order in Council, as by this act for preventing frauds and Regulating 
abuses in the Plantation Trade.”  This would imply that there was widespread corruption amongst the 
governors of the colonies.  The third remedy for suppressing pirates ran: 
 
“That all encouragement be given to discover what Money or Jewells etc has at any time bin given to 
any of the Governors or their Confidents in the plantations either by  pyrates or by their agents...” 
(NMM 1696, GOS/9).  This makes it clear that there was good money to be made by Governors to 
supplement their  income if they would tum a blind eye to piracy and perhaps even protect pirates 
from the Navy and the law.  Presumably m a n y  pirates of the period received letters of Marque from 
their corrupt Governors that should not have been issued, so that they could pass as privateers if 
stopped, but considering t h e  pirates probably used them out of their bounds and instructions, and did 
not declare prize, they cannot have been of much use to them. 
 
Indeed Randolf is supposed to have “complained to the home government that there were seldom less 
than  four pirates  on  the Council  at New  Providence,  and  the  Council  of  trade  and  plantations 
received notice that a member of the Bermuda Council had once been a fiddler aboard a pirate ship” 
(Burg 1983, 99). How could the government use the law to concentrate on removing pirates from the 
seas when the foundation itself that the law rested on in the Colonies was corrupt?   The answer is, 
with difficulty.  Many writers in the past have concentrated on the Navy and the Board of Trade (for 
helping pass a number of Statutes) as the reason for the reduction of piracy in the 18th century, and 
they are right.  But  they have omitted  to  mention  that  those methods  could  only  have  become 
effective once corruption had ceased to continue in the Councils and Governorships of the Colonies, 
perhaps as a result of the suggestions made by Edward Randolf. 
 
This must have been a gradual process and it was only as a result of the government of Britain 
becoming aware that there was a problem with corruption. While loyal Governors such as Thomas 
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Lynch, Governor of Jamaica, strove to prevent piracy from hindering the trade and navigation of his 
colony by sending out ships of war against the offenders (NMM 1682, 605 5-6), it would have done 
little good  had corrupt members of his Committee wa r n e d  pirates or their associates about  any 
impending action against them. 
 
We have seen some form of corruption in almost every aspect of our studies, so although  we can 
chart  the evolution  of  the law in  dealing  with Piracy,  it is my  belief  that it  only became  really 
effective, either by use of laws and statutes, or the use of force by the Navy or Armed Merchants in 
protecting  themselves, when corruption  had been beaten out of the British Colonial administrative 
system, at the beginning of the 18th century. 
 
Privateering on the other hand was in a different category.  It was not prone to corruption like piracy, 
quite simply because if they worked outside the law, any prize they had captured might be forfeited 
and, wo r s e  still , t h e y  m a y  have b een  executed a s  p i r a t e s .  Privateering c o u l d  b e  a  
lucrative occupation when played by the rules, if not it could degenerate into piracy.   We have seen 
that the role of privateers was not far removed from that of pirates and the boundary that divided the 
two was a thin one: 
 
“Between them  (privateers)and Piracy  lay  their  Commissions or  letters  of  Marque, but  when  
the authority  of those Commissions was questioned, or when the privateer smen acted outside  the 
limits  of their Commissions, they easily slipped into the Pirates’ ranks” (Maier 1980, 59-60). 
 
As a result, there evolved many complicated instructions, laws, statutes and rules that were meant to 
keep the privateer in check and to stop them from collectively irreparably damaging a country’s 
reputation by acting outside their Commissions.  These laws that governed the use of privateers are 
important in that they shift and alter according to the political and social climates of the time.   At 
certain stages privateers were looked on solely as another group of loot seeking pirates, as is reflected 
in a letter of Governor Lynch which tells of a certain Captain John Coxon, who, while his ship and 
crew  were  in  Honduras  loading  logwood “was   in  danger  of  loosing   his  life  and  ship,  his  men 
designing  to kill him and go a privateering  with his  ship” (NMM 1682, 605/5-6).  Had they done so, 
surely they would have been guilty, not only of mutiny, but of the piratical stealing of the ship, and 
without a letter of Marque, what Mr. Lynch glibly passes off as “pryvateering”  would be none other 
than piracy in the flrst degree. 
 
However it was recognised that privateering was an important asset to the State.  As I have suggested 
earlier it was a method welcomed by Governments, merchants and those seeking a fortune while 
escaping the ordeals of Navy life.   It increased the  sea power of Britain, without burdening the 
national budget as all the finance came from private enterprise (Mrs. Thatcher would welcome 
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privateering in the event of another war!).  Yet the laws that governed it reflect a marked change of 
attitude toward it around the turn of the century (1700).  They show a growing lack of tolerance 
toward privateering, while earlier on letters of Marque were handed out almost two a penny. A few 
years later and strict controls were being used in the issuing of commissions, and fewer and fewer 
were being given out.  The reason for this could be that there was growing contempt from a growing 
Navy.   The Navy (especially the officers) had always regarded the actions of privateers as stealing 
their rightful prize.  And as the Navy grew in the late 17th/early 18th century, there was less and less 
space on the seas for the privateers to make a living from.  Politicians too, saw little point of, what 
they viewed as half legal rogues roaming the seas, when the Navy could now do its job of keeping the 
seas free of aggressive foreigners, since its size had increased dramatically.   But this decrease in 
privateers reflects an increase in the power of the State, although private war ships were relied upon 
in times of war into the 19th century.  The reduction in privateering is also an important point when 
discussing the reduction of piracy.  Fewer privateers in time of war simply meant fewer pirates in 
time of peace, and there seems little documentary evidence to suggest that the authorities of the time 
realised that this war and peace changeover existed to such an extent.  So we can, to a certain extent, 
see that piracy and privateering were two sides of the same coin, which could be flipped according to 
the political circumstances. 
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